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GIFTS FOR THE BENEFIT OF MINORS

Austin Fleming*
RIMARILY because of tax incentives, lifetime gifts have become
increasingly popular in recent years among persons of wealth.1
Until the Revenue Act of 1948,2 such gifts were frequently made
between spouses.3 But the tax advantages of interspousal gifts were
greatly lessened by the split-income privilege and the marital deduction,
and a new inducement was given to gifts to third persons by the establishment of the right to treat such gifts as being one half from each
spouse.4 As a result, gifts to children and grandchildren have taken on
new prominence.6
Not all present-day gifts to children and grandchildren are tax-motivated. But in a growing number of cases such gifts are made to enable
the donor to achieve lower income tax brackets and to take advantage
of the federal gift tax annual exclusion, lifetime exemption, and lower
gift tax rate brackets ( which in effect are doubled in the case of married
persons) as a method of shifting property to a child or grandchild, at no,
or greatly diminished, tax cost.6 Even when the tax motive is not uppermost, freedom from transfer tax liability is very generally a contributing
factor in making such gifts.
By their nature, gifts to third persons involve an interplay of tax
and property laws and principles, and the legal problems are often sufficiently troublesome when the child or grandchild is an adult. When
he is a minor, the interplay is complicated by the natural as well as the
legal disabilities of infancy. For present purposes, a motive for the gift
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"' Member, Michigan and Illinois bars.-Ed.
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PoLISHER, EsTATE PLANNING AND EsTATE
SHATTUCK, AN ESTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK 497
2

TAX SAVING, 2d ed., 486-493 (1948);
(1948).

62 Stat. L. ll0 (1948).

3 C.C.H., Federal Estate and Gift Tax Reporter, 112070.092.
4 Casner, ''Estate Planning under the Revenue Act of 1948,"

62 HAnv. L. RBv. 413 at
415, 417 (1949); SHATTUCK, AN ESTATE PLANNER'S HANDBOOK 497 (1948).
6 The amendment of the estate tax law by the 1950 Revenue Act to provide that
transfers made more than three years before death shall not be taxed as transfers in contemplation of death furnishes incentive for such gifts.
6 C.C.H., Federal Estate and Gift Tax Reporter, 112070.092: "The 1948 Act changes,
however, result in increasing the efficiency of gifts as a means of reducing tax liability if
the gifts are made to a third person. If they are made to the spouse, however, they no
longer serve much purpose except as a hedge against the prior death of such spouse.
"Gifts to third persons are of increased value in estate planning because of the establishment of a right to treat such gifts as being one-half from each spouse. This has the
effect of doubling the $30,000 exemption, of doubling the $3,000 annual exclusion, and
of doubling the application of each rate bracket. Furthermore, the amounts transferred
during lifetime are still removed from the highest estate tax brackets applicable to the
estate, and they shall shift the burden of income taxes on the transferred property."
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associated with life will be assumed in order to obviate consideration of
contemplation of death problems.
In making a gift to a third person, whether adult or infant, there
are two primary tax objectives to be attained: 7 :6.rst, that the gift shall
be complete and the property effectively transferred-otherwise the
donor remains subject to income tax on the income and fruits of the
property and on capital gains on sale, and the property will be taxed
to his estate for estate tax purposes on his death;8 and second, that the
gift shall be a "present interest" in the donee, making available the
annual gift tax exclusion.
To what extent.is it possible to attain these objectives in the case
of gifts to or for the benefit of minors?
For property law purposes, it is clear that a minor is competent to
receive a gift no matter how young he may be,9 and the appointment
of a guardian is not necessary to effectuate good delivery.10
On the other hand, all the elements of a legal gift must be present
in a gift to a minor as in a gift to an adult, and in general the same rules
apply for determining completeness.11 There must be a donative in~
tent, a delivery to the minor or to someone on his behalf, and an irrevocable parting with all dominion and control over the property by the
donor.12 • It is sometimes said that less evidence is required to establish
a gift to a child than to an adult,13 and in some cases validity of a gift
to a child has even been presumed,14 but for :fixing tax liability a strict
enforcement of the rules is required to protect the public interest, and
whether the donee be a child or an adult, the donor must go as far as
7 LAwnmns and MoNTGOMBRY, GIFTS INvotVING JNstJRANCB Poucms (PARnetJLARLY TO Mmons), Diamond Life Bulletins, Juvenile Insurance-Legal Phases, S-36.5.
s R. C. Coffey, 1 T.C. 579 (1943), affd. (5th Cir. 1944) 141 F. (2d) 204; Theodore
C. Jackson, Admr., 32 B.T.A. 470 (1935); Adolph Weil, 31 B.T.A. 899 (1934), affd.
(5th Cir. 1936) 82 F. (2d) 561, cert. den. 299 U.S. 552, 57 S.Ct. 14 (1936).
9 24 AM. Jun., Gifts, §19, p. 738; 27 AM. Jtm., Infants, §3, p. 747. See also Edward
H. Heller, 41 B.T.A. 1020 at 1029 (1940).
10 Edward H. Heller, 41 B.T.A. 1020 at 1029 (1940); Haggerty, ''How to Make a
Gift to a Minor Effective," 8th AmroAL N.Y. Umv. INsTI'rtlTE ON FEDBRAL TAXAnoN 347
(1950).
11 Adolph Weil, 31 B.T.A. 899 (1934), affd. (5th Cir. 1936) 82 F. (2d) 561, cert.
den. 299 U.S. 552, 57 S.Ct. 14 (1936); Jas. T. Pettus, 45 B.T.A. 855 (1941); Estate of
Lorenzo W. Swope, 41 B.T.A. 213 (1940); Hopkins v. Hughes, 340 III. 604 at 610, 173
N.E. 100 (1930).
12 Apt v. Birmingham, (D.C: Iowa 1950) 89 F. Supp. 361; Edson v. Lucas, (8th Cir.
1930) 40 F. (2d) 398; Lunsford Richardson, 39 B.T.A. 927 (1939), affd. in part, revd.
in part, (2d Cir. 1942) 126 F. (2d) 562; MONTGOMERY, FEDBRAL TAXBs 922 et seq.
(1949-50). , ·
13Love v. Francis, 63 Mich. 181, 29 N.W. 843 (1886); Union Trust & Savings
Bk. v. Tyler, 161 Mich. 561, 126 N.W. 713 (1910).
14 Emil Frank, 27 B.T.A. 1158 at 1164 (1933).
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"nature of the property and the circumstances reasonably permit in
parting with dominion and making the gift irrevocable."16
When the elements of a legal gift are clearly satisfied, the transaction will constitute a "completed gift" for property law purposes, and
will also constitute a "transfer" for the imposition of a federal gift tax,16
even though the donee is a minor. That a completed transfer has
taken place does not, however, insure the allowance of a gift tax annual
exclusion.17 To qualify for such, the gift must be one of a "present
interest," with the donee having an immediate right to the use, possession, and enjoyment of the donated property.18 If there is any postponement of enjoyment, or other deferment or deprivation of rights
connected with use, possession, or enjoyment, the gift will be deemed
one of a future interest with no exclusion available. 19 The governing
principle has been stated by the Supreme Court: 20
"... it is not enough to bring the exclusion into force that the
donee has vested rights. In addition he must have the right presently to use, possess or enjoy the property. These terms are not
words of art, like 'fee' in the law of seizin . . . but connote the
right to substantial present economic benefit. The question is of
time, not when title vests, but when enjoyment begins. Whatever puts a barrier of a substantial period between the will of the
beneficiary or donee now to enjoy what has been given him and
that enjoyment makes the gift one of a future interest within the
meaning of the regulation."
and by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit: 21
"The sole statutory distinction between present and future ·
interests lies in the question of whether there is postponement of
enjoyment of specific rights, powers, or privileges which would be
forthwith existent if the interest were present."
15 Haggerty, "How to Make a
ON FEDERAL TAXATION 347

Gift to a Minor Effective," 8th AmruAL N.Y. UNIV.
(1950); In re Brown's Estate, (Mont. 1949) 206 P.
(2d) 816; Weil v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1936) 82 F. (2d) 561 at 563; City Bk. Farmer's
Trust Co. v. Hoey, (2d Cir. 1939) 101 F. (2d) 9.
16 I.R.C. §IO00(a) imposes a tax upon "the transfer •.. by any individual •.• of
property by gift."
17 Jesse S. Phillips, 12 T.C. 216 at 223 (1949); Commissioner v. Gardner, (7th Cir.
1942) 127 F. (2d) 929.
18 I.R.C. §l003(b); Treas. Reg. 108, §86.11.
19 Commissioner v. Glos, (7th Cir. 1941) 123 F. (2d) 548; French v. Commissioner,
(8th Cir. 1943) 138 F. (2d) 254 at 257; Ryerson v. United States, 312 U.S. 405, 61
S.Ct. 656 (1941); United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399, 61 S.Ct. 659 (1941); Annotation, 158 A.L.R. 171 (1945).
20 Fondren v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18 at 20, 65 S.Ct. 499 (1945). Italics added.
2 1 Commisisoner v. Glos, (7th Cir. 1942) 123 F. (2d) 548 at 550. .

INST.

532

M1cmcAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 49

The "present interest" test under the gift tax law and regulations
makes no distinction between gifts to adults and those to minors.22 All
gifts, no matter to whom made, must meet the same test of immediate
and substantial enjoyment in order to qualify for an exclusion. Further, the nature of the interest of the donee is to be determined .as of
the date of the gift, and not at some later time.23
The burden is on the taxpayer to prove that the gift constitutes a
present intere~t and quali6.es for the exclusion,24 and the penalties for
error are substantial. Contrary to the widely held impression that gift
tax returns are necessary only when gifts of more than $3,000 are made,
the law requires a return to be £led on the entire amount of a gift of a
future interest in property regardless of value. 25 The civil penalty for
failure to £le a return is 25% of the tax due; the penalty for late £ling
is 5% per month up to 25% of the tax due; 26 and good faith on the part
of the taxpayer in believing that a present interest rather than a future
one is involved, does not affect his liability for the penalty.27
When the "present interest" test is applied to gifts to minors, the
legal and natural disabilities of infancy raise the question whether it is
ever possible for a minor to have the absolute enjoyment of donated
property before attaining majority. Though capable of owning property, a child is deemed incompetent to manage it,28 and for this reason,
during a child's minority the law places it in the hands of a guardian
for administration and care.29 Under state statutes fixing the age for
testamentary capacity, a child is incapable of making a will disposing
of his property until he attains in most states the age of twenty-one
years and in others the age of eighteen years.30 It also appears that a
child has no absolute right to a guardian or even to be notified of an
22 Fondren v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18 at 28, 65 S.Ct. 499 (1945).
23 Commissioner v. Brandegee, (1st Cir. 1941) 123 F. (2d) 58 at 61;

Commissioner
v. Gardner, (7th Cir. 1942) 127 F. (2d) 929; Jesse S. Phillips, 12 T.C. 216 at 221 (1949).
24 Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442 at 449, 65 S.Ct. 1328 (1945); Commissioner v. Sharp, (9th Cir. 1946) 153 F. (2d) 163 at 164; Jesse S. Phillips, 12 T.C. 216
at 221 (1949).
25 I.R.C. §l006(a); Treas. Reg. 108, §86.10.
26 I.R.C. §3612(d)(l).
27 Louis Stockstrom, 14 T.C. 652 at 656 (1950); Chas. F. Roeser, 2 T.C. 298 at 304,
305 (1943).
28 Emil Frank, 27 B.T.A. 1158 at 1163 (1933); Hudson's Gdn. v. Hudson, 160 Ky.
432 at 438, 169 S.W. 891 (1914); Commissioner v. Sharp, (9th Cir. 1946) 153 F. (2d)
163.
29 Commissioner v. Sharp, (9th Cir. 1946) 153 F. (2d) 163; Glenn v. Worthy, 169
S.C. 263, 168 S.E. 705 (1933).
ao 57 AM. }UR., Wills, §54, p. 76. The Model Execution of Wills Act promulgated
by The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, adopts the age of
18. The common law limits were age 14 for a male child and 12 for a female.
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application for guardianship in the absence of a statute so requiring,31
the law generally being that the necessity for and the appointment of a
guardian are matters in the discretion of the court having jurisdiction.32
In some states, when a child reaches age fourteen or more he is given
a voice in the choice of his guardian, but even then the selection is
subject to court approval.33
As for the "use and enjoyment" of property, it is well known that
during a child's early life he has no true comprehension of value or
actual capacity for the use and enjoyment of property. From then until
adulthood, a child's requirements, capacities, and abilities develop
only gradually and progressively.34 As for property which, though
owned by a minor, is required by law to be held and administered by
a guardian, it is clear that the minor does not have any actual personal
use, possession, or enjoyment of such property. Consequently it would
appear that every substantial gift of property to a minor child is to a
greater or lesser extent one of postponed rights and powers and of future benefit and enjoyment, and by making the right to an exclusion
turn on present enjoyment, the question is whether the law does not
wittingly or otherwise close the door for all practical purposes against
the allowance of an annual exclusion in the case of gifts to minors.3 1S
It is said that Congress "presumably" did not intend to discriminate
against minors36 and that gifts to minors may be made to which the
exclusion will apply. The Supreme Court in the Fondren31 case said
that it did not follow that if the exclusion did not apply in that case,
it could apply in no other for a minor's benefit. Under what circumstances then will a gift to a minor child be recognized as a "present"
SI Whittelsey v. Conniff, 266 Mo. 567, 182 S.W. 161 (1916); Palmer v. Oakley, 2
Dougl. (Mich.) 433 (1847); Mahan v. Steele, 109 Ky. 31, 58 S.W. 446 (1900); Jones
v. Prairie Oil & Gas Co., 273 U.S. 195, 47 S.Ct. 38 (1927); Annotation, 1 A.L.R. 919
(1919).
82 John W. Kieckhefer, T.C. Dec. No. 17,794 (August 10, 1950), now on appeal to
Seventh Circuit. In re Hann's Guardianship, 100 Cal. App. 743, 281 P. 74 (1929); In re
Wyckoff, 67 Misc. 1, 124 N.Y.S. 625 (1910); Cramer v. Forbis, 31 Ill. App. 259 (1889);
Newton v. Janvrin, 62 N.H. 440 (1883).
as Petition of Stuart, 280 N.Y. 245, 20 N.E. (2d) 741 (1939); Cramer v. Forbis,
31 Ill. App. 259 (1889); In re Hann's Guardianship, 100 Cal. App. 743, 281 P. 74
(1929); 1 ScaoULER, MAllRIAGll, DrvonCB AND SEPARATION, 6th ed., §844, p. 945-6
(1921).
34 27 AM.. Jun., Infants, §7, p. 751.
SIS Disston v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1944) 144 F. (2d) 115 at 119 revd. 325 U.S.
442, 65 S.Ct. 1328 (1945); Waller, J., dissenting in Fondren v. Commissioner, (5th Cir.
1944) 141 F. (2d) 419, affd. 324 U.S. 18, 65 S.Ct. 499 (1945); 2 PousHBn, ESTATE
PLANNING AND EsTATB TAX SAVING, 2d ed., 445, 447 (1948).
36 PAUL, FBDllRAL EsTATB AND G1FT TAXATION, §15.11, p. 635 (1946 Supp.); see
also Disston v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 442, 65 S.Ct. 1328 (1945).
S7 324 U.S. 18 at 29, 65 S.Ct. 499 (1945).
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interest? The rule laid down in the Fondren case is that whenever provision is made for the "immediate application" of the donated property
for the minor's benefit, the exclusion will apply, 38 and as the later case
of Commissioner v. Disston39 made clear, this is to be determined from
the standpoint of the minor, not of the donor, in the light of the minor's
capacity and foreseeable requirements when the gift is made. It is true
that both the Fondren and Disston cases involved transfers in trust, but
the governing principles for determining what is a present interest
would appear to be the same whether the gift is outright or in trust. 40
May this then not mean that a gift having reasonable relation
to a minor's present need may qualify for an exclusion (e.g.,. a
gift of $3,000 to an eighteen-year-old college student), but a gift in
excess of the minor's immediate needs (e.g., a gift of $100,000 to a
six-months-old-baby) would not so qualify? 41 Any such restricted range
for making gifts which qualify for an exclusion provides no answer to
a tax-minded donor whose purpose in giving away a part of his estate
to a minor is solely an estate-planning measure and means of shifting
property with minimum shrinkage through taxes.
38 Ibid. See also Anderson, "Gifts to ChHdren and Incompetents,'' 26 TAXEs 911 at
916 (1948): "But the action of the Commissioner in imposing a tax on the Strekalovsky
gifts shows that in his view the disability of the donee has this result [of transmuting a
present interest to a future interest], at least in the absence of proof that the gift is being
steadHy consumed by the donee and is not being saved or permitted to accumulate."
39 325 U.S. 442 at 448-449, 65 S.Ct. 1328 (1945): " •.. there is always the question
of how much, if any, of the income can actually be applied for the permitted purposes .•••
In the absence of some indication • • . from surrounding circumstances that a steady How
of some ascertainable portion of income to the minor would be required, there is no basis
for a conclusion that there is a gift of anything other than for the future."
40 Rosa A. Howze, 2 T.C. 1254 at 1256 (1943): ''The petitioner points out in her
brief that U.S. v. Pelzer ••• and the other cases relied upon by the Commissioner all have
reference to the rights of the beneficiaries in property which has been placed in trust by the
donor, whereas in the gifts made by the donor in the instant case there were no intervening trusts. • • • While it is true that • . • the . • . cases cited and relied upon by the
Commissioner all involved the rights of beneficiaries in property placed in trust, nevertheless we can not agree that this fact within itself makes petitioner's case distinguishable from
the cases cited. The question here, as in the cases cited, is whether the gifts made were of
'future interests' in property." See also Dora Roberts, 2 T.C. 679 at 686 (1943).
41Anderson, "Gifts to Children and Incompetents,'' 26 TAXEs 911 at 916 (1948):
"We hardly think a gift of one hundred dollars to a twenty-year-old would be taxable,
since, as a practical matter, he could exercise the same control over it as could a person
over twenty-one. But suppose a parent or grandparent deposits one hundred dollars in a
savings account for a baby at birth. The child is unable to withdraw it himself until he
reaches an age when the bank will honor his withdrawal slip. The parent as natural
guardian might be permitted to do so, but the natural guardian would then have the same
duty that the trustee had in the Strekalovsky case. If consistency is a virtue practiced by
the tax collector, he would deny the exclusion to such a gift unless it could be shown that
at the time the gift was made it was contemplated that the money was to be used forthwith
for the child's benefit." See also note, 37 A.B.A.J. 78 at 79 (1951).
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It is also said that it is possible to make a "present" gift to a minor
by transferring the donated property to the minor through a guardian.42
This assumes that a minor child can be said to have the necessary use,
possession, and enjoyment of property that he owns but which the law
requires to be handled through a guardian-a proposition not as yet
finally settled.48 The guardian is, of course, the minor's legal representative and as such has authority under direction of the court to take
possession of the minor's property, exercise ownership rights, make investments, and otherwise act for the minor. 44 The argument is that
since the guardian represents the child in the eyes of the law, if the·
donated property is immediately available to him and he is free to use
the property for whatever he considers the minor's benefit, the gift
should be regarded for purposes of the gift tax law as available for
"immediate application" to the minor's benefit, whatever the age level
or actual capacities of the minor.45 That the legal guardian in turn has
the discretion to withhold the property and its benefits from the child
until a future time or even until majority because in his judgment the
child's interests are better served by conservation is immaterial and
merely equivalent to "an accumulation by an adult donee who chooses
to invest rather than to spend."46 The administration of the tax laws
should be practical, so the argument runs, and a practical administration of the present interest test should regard the rights, controls, and
enjoyment of the guardian as that of the minor.
- There are certain court decisions which appear to support this view.
In Strekalovsky v. Delaney,4 7 a Massachusetts district court considered
the question in a trust for minor children of the grantor, which provided that during the minority of each child the trustee should pay to
the child or for his benefit any parts of his trust share in accordance with
the needs and best interests of the child "as if the interest of each said
42PAUL, FEDERAL EsTATB AND GIPT TAXATION, §15.11, p. 636 (1946 Supp.). Cf.
Strekalovsky v. Delaney, (D.C. Mass. 1948) 78 F. Supp. 556.
48 See Ashcraft v. Allen, (D.C. Ga. 1950) 90 F. Supp. 543 at 545. LAwnmns AND
MoNTGOMBRY, GIPTS lNvoLVING lNsURANcE PoucIBs (PARTICULARLY To Mmons)
Diamond Life Bulletins, Juvenile Ins.-Legal Phases, S-36.5: "Some persons feel that any
necessity for the intervention of a guardian when a minor is a donee may be held sufficient
to make a gift of a future interest, regardless of the type of property given."
44 Dunlap v. Jones, (D.C. Cir. 1941) 38 F. Supp. 593; 39 C.J.S., Guardian and
Ward, §§68, 74; 25 AM. Jtm., Guardian and Ward, §72, p. 48.
45 See Anderson, "Gifts to Children and Incompetents,'' 26 TAXBs 911 at 914 (1948).
46 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIPT TAXATION §15.11, p. 636 (1946 Supp.).
47 (D.C. Mass. 1948) 78 F. Supp. 556. See commentary written by counsel for
donor-taxpayer in 26 TAXBs 911 (1948). No appeal appears to have been applied for by
the collector, perhaps because of the small amount involved.
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child were held by the· trustee herein as guardian for said child and
as if the trustee were making payments and distributions in that capacity for the benefit of each child respectively." The trust also provided that upon demand of any legally appointed guardian of any of the
children, the entire share was to be paid to the guardian. The court
referred to the Fondren case and the "immediate application" test and
held that the .donor. had made a gift for the "present use and benefit"
of each of her children. The court said: 48
"Had she, instead of making the gifts by trust, made them to
the gu_ardians of the children, there could be no questio~ but that
the exemption would apply. The trust instrument clearly expresses her intent to accomplish the same results, and I am satisfied that there was a present right to the use and benefit of this
gift the moment that the gift had vested in the trustee."

In Commissioner v. Sharp,49 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit had before it a $250,000 trust established for the benefit of a
sixteen-year-old son of the donor, under which the trustee was required
to distribute all income, but during the son's minority the ti:ustee had the
discretion to make payments to his mother, or the guardian of his property, or by expending it in such other manner as the trustee believed to
be for his benefit. The facts do not disclose which me~od of payment
the trustee employed, what disposition had been made of income to the
date of trial, whether the child had a legal guardian in fact, or what his
present needs and requirements were. Nevertheless, the court concluded that under the trust provisions the income became "immediately
available"to the minor upon the consummation of the trust and that he
had "at once the right of enjoyment."
In Kinney v. Anglim50 a California district court held that where
separate trusts for minor grandchildren were created, with the income
from each 1:n!St being payable to the mother of the beneficiary until
the child reached the age of twenty-one years, the income right constituted a "present interest" entitling the donor to an annual exclusion.51
(D.C. Mass: 1948) 78 F. Supp. 556 at 558.
153 F. (2d) 163 (1946), affg. 3 T.C. 1062 (1944). It is of interest that the court
expressed itself as bound to affirm the Tax Court's judgment under Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 at 502, 64 S.Ct. 239 (1943) in spite of the fact that the Tax Court
opinion was rendered before the Supreme Court decisions in Fondren and Disston.
50 (D.C. Cal. 1941) 43 F. Supp. 431, appeal dismissed (9th Cir. 1942) 127 F. (2d)
291. The Kinney case antedates Fondren and Disston.
51 The Tax Court cases of Frank M. Gould, 6 T.C.M. 775, CCH Dec. No.
15,894(M) (1947) and Kathrine Schuhmacher, 8 T.C. 453 (1947) are distinguishable.
In Gould, a trustee was empowered to apply so much of the net income of each trust for
a minor as he should think proper, or "in the discretion of the trustee to pay over the net
48
49
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On the other hand, some attorneys feel that any necessity for the
intervention of a guardian when a minor is the donee of a gift is in itself enough to make the gift one of a future interest, regardless of the
type of property given,5 2 and that the legal right of the guardian is not
the economic equivalent demanded by the law.53 A recent statement
by a district court judge suggests this inferentially: 54
"... Thus the case does not raise the question of whether a
minor has present use and possession and enjoyment of property
which he owns in fee but which the law requires to be hap.dled
by his guardian."
However, if ·the above reading of the Fondren and Disston cases
is correct, the fact that property is transferred to a guardian for a minor's
benefit is only one circumstance bearing on the question of the minor's
present enjoyment. A legal guardian would seem to stand in the same
position as a trustee under a duty to apply a fund for a minor's benefit. 55
In such cases, the existence of a duty is not enough. There must be a
showing that the property donated is capable of being immediately enjoyed, and also as to how much, if any, of the_property can be actually
applied presently for the minor's benefit, with the burden being on the
donor to make proof.56 Justice Rutledge declared: 57
"The existence of a duty so to apply the income gives no clue
to the amount that will be needed for that purpose, or the requirements· for maintenance, education and support that were foreseeable at the time the gifts were made."
income to his lawful guardian" until the beneficiary reached twenty-one, and the court
held that a future interest was created since the trustee had no duty to pay over the income
to the beneficiaries' guardian. In Schuhmacher, a gift to a minor's parent as "guardian"
was held to be a future interest where the terms of the gift required the guardian to accumulate the income until majority, but the term "guardian" was used as synonymous with
"trustee,'' with duties and obligations fixed by the terms of the gift, rather than by law.
52 See

supra note 43.
The statutory words "use, possession or enjoyment" are not words of art like "fee"
in the law of seizin, said Justice Rutledge, but "connote the right to substantial present
economic benefit." Italics supplied. Again in Disston, 325 U.S. 442, 65 S.Ct. 1328
(1945) he declared: ''There is always the question of how much, if any," of the donated
property can actually be applied for the minor's benefit.
54 Ashcraft v. Allen, (D.C. Ga. 1950) 90 F. Supp. 543.
551 ScO'IT, TnusTs §7, p. 60 (1939): "A guardian of the property of a person who
is under an incapacity is a trustee in a broad sense of the term. He is under a duty to his
ward to deal with the property for the latter's benefit. A guardian like a trustee is a fiduciary." See also Anderson, "Gifts to Children and Incompetents," 26 TAXEs 911 at 916
(1948). See note 37 A.B.A.J. 78 at 79 (1951).
56 Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442, 65 S.Ct. 1328 (1945). See also Anderson,
"Gifts to Minors and Incompetents,'' 26 TAXEs 911 at 916 (1948).
57 325 U.S. 442 at 448, 65 S.Ct. 1328 (1945).
53
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If a gift to a minor is in excess of his immediate needs and the law
would in any event require the guardian to conserve the minor's property for the minor's future benefit, or if the character of the property
is such that it can be enjoyed only at a future time, then the tax collector
may be expected to argue that futurity is implicit in the gift itself and it
is necessarily one of a future interest regardless of the existence of a
guardianship. 58 In short, it would appear that there must be some showing of actual capacity for enjoyment by the minor himself and capacity
of the property donated to be presently enjoyed, in addition to the existence of a guardianship, to meet the present interest test as applied to
gifts to minors. This is not to deny that the existence of a guardianship
is of value and, indeed, perhaps a necessity in establishing a present gift
in a minor.58 a It is only to say that no categorical affirmative assertion
can be made that a transfer of property to a child under age through a
legal guardian, without more, will satisfy the present interest test in the
existing state of the law.
If the proper rule is that the existence of legal guardianship forestalls or is an element in forestalling any claim that a gift to a minor
constitutes a future interest, the question then arises whether the same
conclusion will follow where, though a guardianship is not in existence
at the time of the gift, yet if a legal guardian were to be appointed at
any time, he would have full right to demand the property and become
entitled to its immediate use, possession, and enjoyment on behalf of
the minor. For example, in a gift of an insurance policy to an infant,
or a savings deposit or Up.ited States savings bond in an infant's name,
or shares of corporate stock registered in a minor's name, is it enough
to obtain the gift tax exclusion to show that a legal guardian, if appointed at any time during the child's minority, could exercise ownership rights on the minor's behalf and have for the child the unrestricted
use, possession, and enjoyment of the property? Whatever legal arguments may be advanced in support of such a conclusion,59 from the
child's standpoint rights which cannot be effectively exercised until a
guardian is appointed or majority attained would seem to be as much a

a

636, note 58 (1946 Supp.).
CCH Dec. No. 17568, where guardianship proceedings were instituted for minors coincident with gifts of insurance policies, the
stated purpose being "to have someone legally empowered to act for the minors to the end
that the required consents for the changing of the policies could be executed by and on behalf of the five children."
59 See Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company, Advanced Underwriting Letter,
December 21, 1949: "It is the opinion of others, including the members of Northwestern's
Law Department, that if the minor is given full control and µie unrestricted right to revoke
the designations, the minor has the right to immediate enjoyment of the gift."
58 PAUL, FEDERAL EsTATl! AND GIFT TAXATION
68a See Spyros P. Skouras, 14 T.C. 523 (1950),
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deferment of these rights and a ''barrier" to their substantial enjoyment
as if they were not possessed.60 The child's legal disabilities make him
powerless to make demands or exercise ownership rights, especially during early years. Parents and others having custody are usually in a
position through the exercise of parental authority and supervision to
defer, if not prevent, the institution of guardianship proceedings, 61 and
as previously pointed out, a minor has no absolute right to the appointment of a guardian, the matter resting in the sound judgment of the
court as to whether it be for the minor's best interests.62 Such appears
to be the view of the Tax Court as evidenced in the recent case of John
W. Kieckhefer63 where the court held in effect that a gift for the benefit
of a minor does not become a "present interest" merely because a legal
guardian may he appointed, and if appointed may demand the donated
property on behalf of the child.
The application of these two primary objectives may now he considered with respect to specific situations in the sequence of gifts of
money, savings bonds, stock, insurance, real estate, and trusteed property.

Money
Money in the form of cash may be the subject of a gift to a minor64
and being beneficial its acceptance will be implied.65 The chief problem for tax purposes is in proving delivery and completeness of transfer,
especially when the child is young and the donor is the child's parent.
60 Deane C. Davis, President, National Life Insurance Company of Vermont, formerly
General Counsel, ''Who Should Be Owner of Minor Policies," Diamond Life Bulletins,
Juvenile Insurance-Legal Phases, S-35: "There is a growing feeling among lawyers that
where the right to change the beneficiary is reserved and a beneficiary is named other than
the insured's estate, in such case the transaction is a 'gift' of a future interest. The reasoning behind this opinion is that, since in such circumstances the minor is powerless to change
the beneficiary because of the legal incompetency incident to minority, he is likewise powerless to exercise the right of surrender, loan or assigrunent, and that as a practical matter
he cannot enjoy the benefits until some future time."
6 1 REsnARCH lNSTITUTB oP .AMERICA, 3 FEDERAL TAX Co-ORDINATOR, §S-716. Gifts
to Minors, p. 36,706: "Since the donor as father is under a legal duty to support his child
during minority, there is almost a presumption to the effect that any gift he chooses to
make to his child is designed for use in the more distant future, and by the exercise of his
parental rights and authority he is ordinarily in a position to defer physical transfer until
the child reaches majority."
62 See supra note 32.
63 Dec. No. I 7,794 (August 10, 1950), now on appeal to Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit. See note 37 A.B.A.J. 78 (1951).
64Edward H. Heller, 41 B.T.A. 1020 (1940); 24 AM. JUR., Gifts, §66 et seq.
65 McKinnon v. First Natl. Bk., 77 Fla. 777, 82 S. 748 (1919); Copeland v. Summers, 138 Ind. 219, 35 N.E. 514, 37 N.E. 971 (1894); Davis v. Garrett, 91 Tenn. 147,
18
113 (1892).

s.w.
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In property law situations less evidence is ordinarily required to establish delivery to a minor than to an adult and may even be presumed. 66
But in tax cases, as already noted, the rule is that the donor must
go as far as the nature of the property and the circumstances reasonably
permit in parting with the funds, and proof of some act of delivery to
the minor, or to another on his behalf, is indispensable. 67 When the
child and the donor reside in the same household, or when due to age
or other circumstances it is not possible or desirable to make delivery
of the funds directly to the child to be held by him personally as his
own property, unequivocal proof of delivery and irrevocability become
difficult. 68 Frequently, the donor continues to hold the funds himself
and treat them as his own, or he turns them over to a spouse to hold for
a child. The funds are placed in a strong box or safe deposit box with
other family valuables and treated like other property of the donor or
spouse; 69 and the dominion, and control exercised over the funds on
behalf of the child become indistinguishable from the dominion and
control of the parent over his other property. As a result the donative
intent becomes uncertain and the transaction is likely to be interpreted
as incomplete.70 If, however, money is turned over to the child and it
becomes his own in possession as well as title, the gift should constitute
a completed transfer.
When the child is small, there is a practical disadvantage to gifts of
cash in that technically there ·is very little that can ·be done with the
cash monies of such a child in the absence of a legal guardian. The
infant himself is incompetent to invest or spend the funds. 71 As natural
guardian, a parent's authority extends only to the custody of the child
and legally the parent has no right of control over his child's property
or authority to invest the child's money without court permission.72
Some parents assume such authority and invest their children's cash
funds in various ways,78 but such a course has elements of liability and
66 67 C.J.S., Parent and Child, §60, p. 770.
67 City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. Hoey, (2d Cir. 1939) 101 F. (2d) 9; Adolph Weil, ,
31 B.T.A. 899 (1934), affd. (5th Cir. 1936) 82 F. (2d) 561, cert. den. 299 U.S. 522,
57 S.Ct. 14 (1936); Coffey v. Commisioner, (5th Cir. 1944) 141 F. (2d) 204.
68 McKinnon v. First Natl. Bk., 77 Fla. 777, 82 S. 748 (1919); 67 C.J.S., Parent and
Child §60, p. 771.
.
69 McKinnon v. First Natl. Bk., 77 Fla. 777, 82 S. 748 (1919).
70Edward H. Heller, 41 B.T.A. 1020 (1940); Adolph Weil, 31 B.T.A. 899 (1934),
affd. (5th Cir. 1936) 82 F. (2d) 561, cert. den. 299 U.S. 552, 57 S.Ct. 14 (1936);
Haggerty, "How to Make a Gift to a Minor Effective," 8th AmroAL N.Y. Umv. INST. ON
FED. TAXATION 347 (1950).
71 See supra notes 28 and 29.
72 Annotation, 6 A.L.R. ll5 (1920). ·
1s Prudence Miller, 7 T.C. 1245 at 1249 (1946); Edward H. Heller, 41 B.T.A. 1020
at 1030 (1940).
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risk to the parent and, if the parent is the source of the gift, may well
prevent the gift from being considered complete. In such situations the
existence of a legal guardianship in effect at the time of the cash gift
has value in keeping the identities of the donor and donee separate
and distinct.74
Whether a gift of cash to a minor will be recognized as a "present
interest" for gift tax purposes, would appear to turn on the age of the
child and the circumstances of the gift. A cash gift of $3,000 to a child
approaching majority would undoubtedly qualify for an exclusion. Indeed, of all forms of property, a gift of cash to such a child stands the
best chance of .being recognized as a present gift for the simple reason
that there are things an older child, though in nonage, can do in his
own right with cash that would be impossible with other forms of property such as real estate, insurance policies, or corporate stocks. His
needs and occasions for spending approximate those of an adult and his
technical minority is not generally regarded as a bar to cash dealings.
An older child may buy and cash United States savings bonds in his
own name. 75 A child of fifteen or over may apply for and acquire insurance on his own life under statutes in effect in many states.76 In
most communities, either by statute or business custom, a child nearing legal age may rent a safe deposit box or open a bank account in his
own name and make deposits and withdrawals in the manner of an
adult.77
On the other hand, if a minor is a baby or a child of early years and
the gift involves a substantial sum, the taxing authorities may claim that
futurity is implicit in the gifts by the nature of things. In that event
the fact that the subject matter is cash rather than some other form of
property would seem to be immaterial on the availability of the exclusion.78

Checks
Gifts of money in the form of a check present the same and some
additional problems as gifts of cash. Until a check is cashed, it does not
constitute a completed gift since the donor is free to revoke it.79 As
74 Cf. H. C. Priester, 33 B.T.A. 230 (1935).
75 31 C.F.R. §§315.4(a), 315.39.
76 For example see ill. Rev. Stat. (1949), c.

73, §854. Also generally, 44 C.J.S., In·
surance, §246, p. 1016.
77 2 PAToN's DIGEST, Deposits, Opinions 10:1, 10:7 (1942).
78 Supra notes 41, 58.
791 PATON's DIGEST, Checks, Opinion 13:11 (1940); 24 AM. Jmt., Gifts, §95,' p.
779; Annotations, 20 A.L.R. 177 (1922); 44 A.L.R. 625 (1926).
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for endorsing the check for payment or deposit, the law of most states
is that a minor's endorsement will pass title,80 but if the child is very
young and unable to sign, there technically is not much that can be
done in the absence of a legal guardian. 81 As a matter of business practice, some banks honor checks payable to infants on a parent's endorsement and assumption of responsibility, and where a check is merely
being deposited, a rubber stamp endorsement for deposit to the child's
account is very generally honored, but such conduct places the parent
in a position of assuming authority over the child's property, which he
has no strict legal right to do, and makes him and the bank subject to
possible liability consequences.82
Deposits

A common practice among gift-minded parents and grandparents is
to open a savings account in the name of, or in trust for, a minor child
or ·grandchild and deposit annually therein amounts equal to the gift
tax exclusion.
Deposits in a bank may be the subject of a valid gift,83 but the mere
opening of a savings account in the name of another person is not of
itself sufficient to establish a present gift of the account, since it may
have been done for any one of a number of reasons, each without donative intent.84 In addition, it must appear that the depositor has surrendered the passbook or otherwise manifested his intention to make a
completed gift.85
Some courts, relying upon the presumption of acceptance in the
case of a beneficial gift to a minor, have held for property law purposes
that the opening of a savings account in the name of a minor child
constituted a completed gift, even though the donor did not completely
so Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act §22; 2 PATON'S DIGEST, Indoxser and Indorsement, Opinion 9: 1 (1940).
812 PAToN's DIGEST, Indorser and Indorsement, Opinion 9:3 (1941): ''The indorsement by the parent of the name of a minor child to a negotiable instrument payable to a
minor, is invalid, in the absence of the appointment of such parent as the legal guardian
of the child."
822 PATON'S DIGEST, Indorser and Indorsement, Opinion 9:1 (1940); Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act §23.
ss Knight v. Mears, 156 Va. 676, 159 S.E. 119 (1931); Union Trust Bk. v. Tyler,
161 Mich. 561, 126 N.W. 713 (1910); Wade v. Smith, 213 Mass. 34, 99 N.E. 477
(1912); Petition of McCredy, 274 App. Div. 363, 83 N.Y.S. (2d) 806 (1948); Blake
v. Torrington Natl. Bk. & Tr. Co., 130 Conn. 707, 37 A. (2d) 241 (1944).
84 First Natl. Bank of Portland v. Connally, 172 Ore. 434, 138 P. (2d) 613 at 623
(1943).
85 Annotations, 59 A.L.R. 979 (1929); 157 A.L.R. 925 (1945); 168 AL.R. 1324
(1947); 1 A.L.R. (2d) 538 (1948); 1 ScOTT, TnusTs §58.6, p. 366 (1939); 5 ZoLLMANN,
BANXs AND BANKING §3192, p. 202 (1936); 5 N1SC1m, BANKS AND BANKING §86, p. 176.
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surrender possession or control of the passbook.86 Most courts, however, require the same proof of executed intent on the part of the depositor in cases of deposits in the name of a minor as in other cases,81
and the holding would undoubtedly be the same for tax law purposes
in view of the stricter requirements of proof for shifting tax liability.88
Accordingly, if the parent or grandparent retains the passbook without which no withdrawal may be made, or has an understanding with
the bank that no withdrawals may be made from the account until the
minor "attains age twenty-one" or without the donor's approval, or
keeps any other string over the account, he may find that he has not
accomplished the first objective of an effective gift.
Nor does the mere opening of a savings account in the name of a
minor necessarily qualify the deposit for an annual exclusion. Such an
account opened for a child nearing majority, with the passbook delivered to him and no control reserved to the donor, might be recognized
as a present interest if under local statutes or case law such a child may
withdraw monies from the account at any time in his own right, even
though technically in nonage.89 Even then the issue may tum on the
amount involved and other circumstances. The fact that the donor
chooses a savings account as a vehicle of gift suggests by its nature
accumulation and an intent to confer future benefits, and though not
determinative may be regarded as a circumstance bearing on the question of future interest. 90
If the donee is a small child under the age when any bank would
recognize his demands for withdrawal, it seems probable that futurity
would be claimed to be inherent in any savings account which might be
opened in his name and the deposits therein would not qualify as a
present interest.91 Also, if the account carries a condition that no withdrawals may be made before reaching majority or that the consent of a
third person is required or has other limitations postponing enjoyment,
the deposit will be deemed to be a future interest regardless of how close
to majority the minor may be.
86 Collins v. Collins' Aclmr., 242 Ky. 5, 45 S.W. (2d) 811 (1931); McKinnon v.
First Natl. Bk., 77 Fla. 777, 82 S. 748 (1919); Annotation, 1 A.L.R. (2d) 538 at 545
(1948).
87 Annotation, 1 A.L.R. (2d) 538 at 546 (1948); Fernald v. Fernald, 80 N.H. 75,
113 A. 223 (1921); Carr v. MacDonald, 70 R.I. 65, 37 A. (2d) 158 (1944); Pickering
v. Higgins, 69 R.I. 22, 38 A. (2d) 640 (1943); Cashman v. Mason, (8th Cir. 1948)
166 F. (2d) 693.
88 Howard B. Lawton, 6 T.C. 1093 at 1102 (1946).
89 No case involving the question has been found.
90 See Anderson, "Gifts to Children and Incompetents," 26 TAXBs 911 at 916 (1948).
91 See supra note 58.
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Whether the existence of a legal guardianship for a small child at
the time the account is opened and the surrender of the passbook to the
guardian will alter these conclusions turns on considerations already discussed. 92 If the rights and enjoyment of the legal guardian are deemed
to be those of the minor for gift tax purposes, and the amount of the
deposit has a reasonable relation to the minor's foreseeable needs, the
transaction should satisfy the present interest test and qualify for an exclusion. Without a guardianship, the account could not be utilized or
availed of by the young child, and hence would entail a deferment of
rights and render doubtful the right to a tax exclusion. 93
Trusteed Savings Accounts

A device frequently employed in attempting to effect gifts to minors
is the deposit of monies in a savings accoup.t in the name of the donor
or other adult as trustee for the child.94 Obviously, such a deposit creates no direct completed gift to the minor. If an effective transfer is
achieved, it must be found in the creation of a valid irrevocable trust
under which an equitable interest passes immediately and unconditionally to the child.95 But as Professor Bogert has pointed out: "The
deposit of money in a bank under a trust title is considered equivocal.
Men frequently deposit money under a trust title from other motives
than that of creating a trust." 96 Consequently, the mere style of account is insufficient to show the establishment of an irrevocable trust.
. There must in addition be proof of an intent to make an immediate
gift for the benefit of the cestui as well as a stripping of the donor of
all right to retake the funds or to have their use and benefit during his
lifetime.97
When the donor opens a savings account in the name of a third
person in trust for the minor, for example, in the name of B in trust
for a minor son, and delivers the passbook to the trustee with full donative intent, reserving no control or other rights over the funds, ·it is
92 Supra pp. 535-538.
9:\John W. Kieckhefer, Dec. No. 17,794 (August 10, 1950), now on appeal to Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
94 See Moynihan, ''Trusts of Savings Deposits in Massachusetts," 22 BoST. Umv. L.
REv. 271 (1942). The author states that from 50% to 80% of the total number of savings
bank accounts is made up of "trustee" accounts.
95 Fleck v. Baldwin, 141 Tex. 340, 172 S.W. (2d) 975 at 978 (1943).
96 1 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §47, p. 203 (1935).
97 Moynihan, "Trusts of Savings Deposits in Massachusetts," 22 BosT. Umv. L. REv.
271 at 272-3 (1942); Fleck v. Baldwin, 141 Tex. 340, 175 S.W. (2d) 203 (1943); 24
AM. Jun., Gifts, §103, p. 784.
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reasonably clear that an irrevocable trust results and constitutes a complete and effective transfer of the funds in the account.98
But in actual practice third party agreements are the exception.
More frequently, accounts are opened in the donor's own name "in
trust" for the child. In most communities, banks permit the establishing of savings account trusts with the depositor as trustee, and many
donors, particularly when a parent of the child, prefer to act as trustee
themselves rather than to name a third person.
It is of course possible legally for a person to be both trustor and
trustee of a revocable as well as an irrevocable trust.99 The question in
each case is one of the donor's intention and surrounding circumstances
as to whether he has in fact created an irrevocable trust, or whether he
has created only a revocable one to take effect at death, or whether he
has established no trust at all, but only has what the Tax Court has
called a "kind of budgetary reserve" to meet anticipated financial outlays for the child.100 Undoubtedly a donor may constitute a selftrusteed savings account an irrevocable trust and make an effective transfer of the funds in the account from his estate.101 For example, it has
been held that the delivery of the passbook to a child or to someone for
him with full donative intent and a parting with further ownership and
enjoyment of the funds makes an account an irrevocable trust.102 An
incorporation of the trust terms in the deposit agreement has been held
sufficient to show a present and irrevocable transfer.103 Declarations
and statements made to a child or to a third person for him at the time
of the deposit may be sufficient to establish an irrevocable trust.104 The
difficulty with many self-trusteed savings accounts for minors has been
not so much a lack of intent to create an effective completed gift for
the benefit of the child as a failure to accompany the deposits with
unequivocal declarations and conduct indicative of such an intent and
98 Whelan v. First Mechanics Natl. Bk. of Trenton, 15 N.J. Misc. 507, 192 A. 369
(1937); Tiber v. Heller, 173 Misc. 333, 17 N.Y.S. (2d) 59 (1939); 2 PAToN's DIGBST,
Deposits, Opinion 15:12 (1941).
99'fheodore D. Stern, Dec. No. 17,890 (October 18, 1950); l SCOTT, TRUSTS
§100, p. 538 (1939).
100 Estate of John Howard Helfrich, 1 T.C. 590 at 593 (1943), revd. (7th Cir. 1944)
143 F. (2d) 43.
1012 PATON'S DIGBST, Deposits, Opinion 15:10 (1941).
102 McGary Estate, 355 Pa. 232, 49 A. (2d) 350 (1946); l SCOTT, TRUSTS §58.1,
p. 356 and cases cited; Annotation, 49 A.L.R. 897 (1902).
10s Albert v. Albert, 334 Ill. App. 440, 80 N.E. (2d) 69 (1948); Helfrich's Estate v.
Commissioner, (7th Cir. 1944) 143 F. (2d) 43.
104 Mucha v. Jackson, ll9 N.J. Eq. 348, 182 A. 827 (1936); Kuck v. Raftery, ll7
Cal. App. 755, 4 P. (2d) 552 (1931); l ScOTT, TRUSTS §58.1, p. 356 (1939); Annotations, 157 A.L.R. 925 (1945); 168 A.L.R. 1324 (1947).
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with an absolute parting of ownership and use of funds. In some cases
local banking practices impose a hurdle. Acting under statutes
in effect in most states recognizing self-trusteed savings accounts,1011
many banks have provided printed forms for savings trust accounts
reading merely, "A in trust for B," without requiring further disclosure
of trust terms or other evidence of the depositor's intent. Parents or
grandparents open such accounts for minors, keep the passbook, and
neglect to disclose the deposit to the child or take other steps to consummate' their donative purpose. A completed gift of equitable or
legal interest can scarcely be expected to arise under such circumstances, and statutes which authorize such accounts are of no aid since
their purpose is only to protect banks in making payments and not to
fix the legal rights of the beneficiary.106 The New York Court of
Appeals has aptly summarized the legal situation generally held to prevail: 107
" ... A deposit by one person of his own money, in his own
name as trustee for another, standing alone, does not establish an
irrevocable trust during the lifetime of the depositor. It is a tentative trust merely, revocable at will, until the depositor dies or
completes the gift in his lifetime by some unequivocal act or
declaration, such as delivery of the passbook or notice to the
. "
benefi c1ary.
One serious aspect of savings trust accounts for minors, frequently
overlooked by donors, banks, and third persons actiJ;lg as trustees alike,
is the legal liability engendered by the deposit of checks and other negotiable paper payable in the name of the child to the trust account. The
trustee's authority to endorse and deposit checks to such an account is
limited to instruments payable to himself as trustee and does not extend
to paper payable to the child.108 The legal guardian of the minor alone
has the authority to endorse negotiable instruments in the child's name,
and an endorsement of the child's name by the trustee of a savings trust
account is unauthorized and invalid, and the fact that the trustee is a
parent of the child is immaterial since the parent is only a natural guardian of the person, with no legal authority over the property of the mi105 For list of states having Deposits in Trust Statutes see 2 PAToN's lliGI!S'l', Deposits,
Opinion 15:2 (1941) and 1949 Supplement.
106 In re Gates' Estate, 107 N.J. Eq. 310, 152 A. 374 (1930); TnuS'l's Rl!S'l'A'l'EMEN'l'
§58(d); 1 ScoTr, TnusTs §58.3, p. 362 (1939).
107 In re Totten, 179 N.Y. 112 at 125, 71 N.E. 748 (1904); Wilder v. Howard, 188
Ga. 426, 4 s.E. (2d) 199 (1939). See also TRUSTS REsTA'l'EMEN'l' §58; 2 P.AToN's Dl:GBST,
Deposits, Opinion 15:1 and 1949 Supplement.
10s Cf. Charles L. Flaccus, 2 T.C.M. 1180, CCH Dec. No. 13,663(M) (1943).
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nor.109 The lack of authority in the trustee to endorse the child's checks
makes him personally liable to the child on reaching majority.110 Also,
since the trustee's endorsement conveys no title, payment of the check
by the drawer bank is improper and may be impeached by the child on
coming of age,1 11 and the bank of deposit may also be held liable112 for
knowingly permitting the diversion of monies from the child to an account which is subject to withdrawals by a third person and over which
neither the child nor his legal representative has any control.
T axwise, the use of a savings trust account as a method of making
gifts to minors may actually have the effect of increasing rather than
diminishing the donor's tax cost. A present interest in the minor for
gift tax purposes does not necessarily follow from the creation of a valid
and irrevocable trust.113 The determining factors are the present rights
of the minor in the account. The fact that the deposits are trusteed with
a trustee rather than the child or his legal representative having the
authority to say when, in what amounts, and how deposits are to be
paid to them compels the conclusion that no part of the deposits qualify for a gift tax exclusion114 and a gift tax is payable on each dollar of
deposit irrevocably placed in the account. Also, when the donor acts as
trustee of the account, he is placed in a position where his power of
management and control over the account and authority to disburse or
accumulate the funds may be sufficient to cause the deposits to be included in his estate for estate tax purposes as a trust to take effect in possession or enjoyment at the donor's death. 115
Savings Bonds

The promotion of sales of United States savings bonds as a part of
the emergency expansion of federal borrowing has resulted in a widespread use of such bonds as a form of gift to minors.
1002 PAToN's Th:GEsT, Indorser and Indorsement, Opinion 9:3 (1941).
110 New Georgia Natl. Bk. v. Lippmann, 249 N.Y. 307, 164 N.E. 108 (1928), 60
A.L.R. 1344 (1929); Pain v. Holtcamp, (8th Cir. 1926) 10 F. (2d) 443; Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law §20.
111 Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law §23.
112 Bowers, v. Fourth & First Natl. Bk., 9 Tenn. App. 76 (1928); 1 PATON'S Th:GBST,
Checks, Opinion 3:12, p. 993 (1941).
113 See infra p. 562.
114 See infra p. 562.
lllS Wasserman v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1944) 139 F. (2d) 778; Helfrich's Estate
v. Commissioner, (7th Cir. 1944) 143 F. (2d) 43; Hasbrouck v. Martin, 120 N.J. Eq. 96,
183 A 735 (1936). Contra: McGary Estate, 355 Pa. 232, 49 A. (2d)' 350 (1946);
Schneider, "The Inter Vivos Trust For a Minor: Its Estate Tax Aspect," 28 TAXES 825
at 826 (1950).
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In lay eyes they are apt to be regarded as just another kind of bond
with the legal incidents and characteristics of ordinary choses in action.
Actually, they are special and peculiar.116 Creatures of special federal
statute,1 17 they are controlled by federal laws and regulations rather
than by state rules. 118 Applicable Treasury Regulations119 expressly
prohibit the transfer of such bonds and provide generally that they are
payable only-to the owner or owners named therein.120
It is almost universally held that United States savings bonds may
not be the subject of gift by manual delivery, since such a transfer would
be a violation of the terms of the bonds and of the Regulations under
which they are issued and the donee would be unable to collect the proceeds.121 A donor intending to make a present gift of a United States.
savings bond to a minor would therefore be unwise to use outstanding
bonds, but should purchase new bonds for the purpose.
Treasury Regulations expressly permit a minor, whether or not
under a legal guardianship1 to be named as "owner, co-owner, or beneficiary on bonds purchased by another person with such person's own
funds."122
A bond "payable on death" to a minor would be inappropriate for
use as a gift in praesenti. So also would be a bond in co-ownership form
payable to the purchaser or the minor, since the Regulations provide
that a co-ownership bond will be paid to either co-owner upon request
during the lifetimes of both co-owners,1 23 and the right of the donor to
obtain payment of the bond at any time would be repugnant to a completed gift of the bond to the minor at the time of purchase.
· As regards a bond registered in the sole name of a minor, the Reguus Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Tezyk, 140 N.J. Eq. 474 at 477, 55 A. (2d) 26
(1947): "Such bonds have a peculiar status, for they are intended for issue in every state,
are backed by the credit of the federal government, and are offered for sale subject to
conditions which it must be assumed were intended to enhance the borrowing power of
the federal government."
111 I.R.C. §757(c).
118 Franklin Washington Trust Co. v. Beltram, 133 N.J. Eq. 11, 29 A. (2d) 854
(1943); In re Briley, 155 Fla. 798, 21 S. (2d) 595 (1945); Harvey v. Rackliffe, 141 Me.
169, 41 A. (2d) 455 (1945); Annotation, 168 A.L.R. 245 at 248 (1947); 173 A.L.R.
550 (1948).
119 The Regulations are codified in 31 C.F.R., Part 315.
120 31 C.F.R., §315.11.
121 Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Tezyk, 140 N.J. Eq. 474, 55 A. (2d) 26 (1947); In
re Nettle's Estate, 91 N.Y.S. (2d) 255 (1949), affd., 276 App. Div. 929; 94 N.Y.S. (2d)
704 (1950); Brown v. Vinson, 188 Tenn. 120, 216 S.W. (2d) 748 (1949); Moore's
Admr. v. Marshall, 302 Ky. 729, 196 S.W. (2d) 369 (1946). Contra: Marshall v. Felker,
156 Fla. 476, 23 S. (2d) 555 (1945); Annotations, 173 A.L.R. 550 (1948); 168 A.L.R.
245 (1947).
122 31 C.F.R., §315.4(b)(2).
123 31 C.F.R., §315.45(a).
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lations provide that payment will be made directly to him on presentation if "at the time payment is requested, he is of sufficient competency
and understanding to sign his name to the request and understand the
nature of such act,"124 unless the form of registration shows that a guardian has been appointed for the minor, in which case payment will be
made only to the guardian.126 If the minor is not of sufficient competency and understanding to execute the request for payment, payment
will be made to "either parent of the minor with whom he resides or if
the minor does not reside with either parent then to the person who
furnishes his chief support."126
Gifts of United States savings bonds have been generally held valid
for property law purposes under circumstances as to actual delivery
which, if the gifts were of ordinary choses in action, would not be sustained.121 Thus the mere purchase of a bond in the name of another
person has been regarded as sufficient to consummate a gift of the bond,
even though possession has been withheld by the purchaser.128 But as
already seen in other connections, the property rule is not controlling for
tax purposes.
Taxwise, United States savings bonds are subject to gift, inheritance, and estate taxes, even though instrumentalities of the Federal Govemment1 29 and their status for gift tax purposes is set forth in
Treasury Department Mim. 5202.130 It is declared that if a donor purchases with his own funds a savings bond in the sole name of another
person as owner, the transaction is regarded as giving rise to an immediate gift. A bond purchased in co-ownership form does not result in a
gift unless and until the donor permits the co-owner to cash the bond
and retain the proceeds, in which event a gift of the then value of the
bond results. A bond "payable on death" to another is declared to give
rise to no inter vivas gift. These views of the Treasury Department
would seem to make it imperative for a donor wishing to make a gift of
United States savings bonds to a minor to confine his gift to bonds registered solely in the name of the child.
124 31 C.F.R., §315.39.
125 31 C.F.R., §315.38.
12a 31 C.F.R., §315.40.
127Parkinson v. Wood, 320 Mich. 143 at 148, 30 N.W. (2d) 813 (1948); Ibey v.
Ibey, 93 N.H. 434, 43 A. (2d) 157 (1945); Myers v. Hardin, 208 Ark. 505, 186 S.W.
(2d) 925 (1945).
128 Parkinson v. Wood, 320 Mich. 143, 30 N.W. (2d) 813 (1948).
129 31 C.F.R., §318.2(g); 1941-2 Cum. Bul. 241; State Board of Equalization v. Cole,
(Mont. 1948) 195 P. (2d) 989; Hallett v. Bailey, (Me. 1947) 54 A. (2d) 533 (1947).
1so 1941-2 Cum. Bul. 241.
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While the special nature of savings bonds makes the element of
delivery, apart from that implicit in registration, unimportant for property law purposes, it is not clear that the same conclusion applies for
estate and inheritance tax purposes. Mimeograph 5202 makes no mention of physical possession and seems to suggest that for tax purposes,
as well as for property law purposes, the form of registration of the
bond, not physical possession, is controlling. No decision has been
found involving the liability of a donor's estate for federal estate tax
where he continued to retain possession of savings bonds registered in
the sole name of a third person. The problem has arisen in a few state
court decisions involving the application of state inheritance tax laws
to savings bonds payable to another as owner or co-owner when possession has been retained by the donor. The results, however, are not conclusive. In Inheritance Tax Division 11. The Chamberlin Estate,131 a
grandparent purchased savings bonds in the name of minor grandnieces
and grandnephews and informed their mother of his purchases, but
then placed the bonds in his safe deposit box in envelopes bearing their
names, where they were found at the time of his death. Under a state
statute taxing all property passing by gift taking effect in possession or
enjoyment at or after the death of the donor, the court held that a completed gift occurred at the time of purchase and hence the bonds were
not subject to tax under the statute. The facts could be said to make out
a case of constructive delivery,132 but the court based its holding on the
fact that the gift was complete when the grandparent "procured the
United States to register (the named payee) as the owner of the debt."
Succession of T anner,1 33 involving a co-ownership form of savings
bond, reached a similar conclusion, but was handed down by a divided
court, and a contrary result was reached in a later Louisiana Supreme
Court decision.134 In In re Brown's Estate,1 35 the Montana Supreme
Court held a co-ownership form of savings bond retained in the donor's
possession taxable in the purchaser's estate for death tax purposes and
stressed the fact that in tax issues a strict enforcement of the rules of
delivery is necessary and a failure to make delivery compels the conclusion that a gift of savings bonds was intended to take effect at or
after death. Whatever the correct rule, the achievement of the first
objective of an effective gift would seem to require that a donor not only
13121 Wash. (2d) 790, 153 P. (2d) 305 (1944).
132 See RABKIN AND JOHNSON, FBDBRAL INcoMB, GIFT AND ESTATE
§4, p. 2913b (1942). Cf. Lillian Blake, 23 B.T.A. 554 (1931).
133 24 s. (2d) 642 (1946).
134 Succession of Raborn, 210 La. 1033, 29 S. (2d) 53 (1946).
135 (Mont. 1949) 206 P. (2d) 816.
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purchase and register savings bonds in the sole name of the minor, but
also make physical delivery of them to the minor or to someone on his
behalf and not retain them or place them in his safe deposit box.
Contrary to the popular impression, it is far from clear that a gift
of a United States savings bond to a minor qualifies for a gift tax exclusion. As their name suggests, they are designed to be held for a
period of years and are called "appreciation" bonds.136 In the case
of the familiar "E" bond, no interest is paid until maturity or redemption, and even in the case of "G" bonds, which pay interest currently,
full advantage of interest at the rate specified may be secured only if the
bonds are held until maturity. If the donor's intention is significant,1 37
the fact that he selects a savings bond rather than money as a vehicle of
gift to a minor indicates that he has future benefits in mind rather than
"immediate application" for the minor's bene:6.t.138 If the minor is a
small child beneath the age when his personal request for payment will
be recognized, the commissioner may be expected to claim that a future
interest is involved and a gift of a savings bond will not qualify for an
exclusion. The result ought to be otherwise with the child nearing
legal age in view of the liberality of the Regulations on the matter of
cashing bonds and the willingness of the Government to recognize the
personal request of a rninor.139

Stocks
Corporate stocks may be the subject of a gift to a minor and, generally speaking, minors may become stockholders of corporations.140
However, for a gift of corporate stock to be effective, there must be
a donative intent and absolute parting with ownership and control and
an actual or constructive delivery of the certi:6.cates to the minor or to
someone on his behalf.141
136 See 31 C.F.R.,
137 In Fondren v.

§315.20.
Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18 at 28, 65 S. Ct. 499 (1945), Justice
Rutledge said: "If motive has bearing, it is only by reason of its effect upon the element of
time and whatever relation may be given, by the particular terms of the gift, to it and the
disclosing of a purpose to provide for or against immediate enjoyment."
188 See Anderson, "Gifts to Children and Incompetents," 26 TAXEs 911 at 916 (1948).'
1so 31 C.F.R., §315.39.
140 13 AM. Jun., Corporations, §396, p. 453; James T. Pettus, 45 B.T.A. 855 at 860
(1941); Edward H. Heller, 41 B.T.A. 1020 (1940); Lawrence Miller, 2 T.C. 285 at 288
(1943); Curtis A. Herberts, 10 T.C. 1053 (1948). However, it is generally held unless
expressly permitted by statute, an infant cannot become one of corporators in forming a
corporation, because of his incapacity to make a binding contract. 1 FLETCHBR, CYc. CoRP.
§ 83, p. 284 (1931).
141 R. C. Coffey, 1 T.C. 579 (1943), affd. (5th Cir. 1944) 141 F. (2d) 204; Naomi
Towle Bucholz, 13 T.C. 201 at 203 (1949); Ralph R. Anderson, 5 T.C. 443 at 450

552

M1cmpAN LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 49

A declaration to a third person by a parent that he is making a gift
of stock to his minor children is not enough to constitute a valid gift
where the parent retains the certificates in his possession, fails to have
the shares transferred on the books of the corporation, and continues to
receive dividends and use them for his own purposes without any accounting to the minors.142 Neither is it enough merely to open accounts
in the name of the child on the donor's private books and carry stocks
for the account in street name.143
Occasionally a donor will hand over stock certificates to a minor or
to a third person for him or otherwise make effective delivery with full
donative intent, but fail to have the certificates transferred from his
name to that of the minor on the books of the company. Such conduct
for property law purposes may be regarded as sufficient to effect a gift
without registration, since registration is not regarded as a requisite to a
completed gift of stock.144 In tax situations, however, the court has said
that failure to transfer donated shares to the name of a child on the
books of the corporation permits the donor to keep control of the disposition of the stock and hence prevents the transfer from being an absolute and irrevocable parting of title and dominion.146
·
In other cases a donor will register stock in the name of a minor,
but direct the certificate.to be redelivered to himself, held by the corporation, or otherwise remain subject to his control. For property law purposes and in some tax controversies, it has been held that a transfer of
corporate stock on the books of the corporation is a sufficient delivery
and parting with control, even though the certificate when issued is retained by the donor or is under his direction and is not delivered to the
donee.146 Generally speaking, however, the courts have held in tax connections that delivery must be as complete as the circumstances will permit.147 Possession is an indicia of title and withholding it from the donee
(1945), affd. (7th Cir. 1948) 164 F. (2d) 870, cert. den. 334 U.S. 819, 68 S.Ct. 1085
(1948); Adolph Weil, 31 B.T.A. 899 (1934), affd. (5th Cir. 1936) 82 F. (2d) 561, cert.
den. 299 U.S. 552, 57 S.Ct. 14 (1936); Annotations, 99 A.L.R. _1077 (1935); 152 A.L.R.
427 (1944); see also 125 A.L.R. 780 (1940).

142 R. C. Coffey, 1 T.C. 579 (1943).
143 Ludwig Bendix, 14 T.C. 681 (1950) (income tax).
144 In re Estate of Jones, 274 Ill. App. 616 (1934);

12 FLBTCHBR, CYc. CoRP.
§5496 (1931); 24 AM. Jun., Gifts, §78, p. 771; Annotation, 38 A.L.R. 1366 (1925).
145 Ludwig Bendix, 14 T.C. 681 (1950); Adolph Weil, 31 B.T.A. 899 (1934), affd.
(5th Cir. 1936) 82 F. (2d) 561, cert. den. 299 U.S. 552, 57 S.Ct. 14 (1936).
140 Phillips v. Plastridge, 107 Vt. 267, 179 A. 157 (1935); Chicago Title & Trust Co.
v. Ward, 332 Ill. 126, 163 N.E. 319 (1928); Annotation, 99 A.L.R. 1077 at 1080 (1935);
Lawton v. Commissioner, (6th Cir. 1947) 164 F. (2d) 380, revg. 6 T.C. 1093 (1946).
147 Ralph R. Anderson, 5 T.C. 443 (1945); Theodore C. Jackson, 32 B.T.A. 470 at
477 (1935): ''Transfer and delivery of property, including corporate stock, are not con-
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is a sign of incompleteness and equivocation. Therefore, any withholding of the certificate from the donee, even though duly registered in his
name, may prevent the gift from being complete for tax purposes.
Apart from these technical problems, there are many practical objections to the use of corporate stock as a medium of gift to minors.148
If the stock pays dividends aggregating $500 or more, the parent loses
his income tax exemption for the child.149 Where the child is young
and has no legal guardian, there are the difficult problems already
discussed of depositing dividend checks and investing and disposing of
the monies received.150
When apprised of infancy, some transfer agents refuse to make a
transfer unless a legal guardian is appointed, and if they make the
transfer, they ordinarily register the stock in the name of "John Jones,
a minor."1151 When that is done, a legal guardianship is unavoidable in
making sale or taking any other action with respect to the stock.152
In closely-held corporations where in any situation the consent of
stockholders may be important, the disability of a minor and his right to
disaffirm his acts on majority may prove embarrassing.153
Some courts,154 notably Ohio,1 55 have held that a minor cannot give
a proxy, although it is not clear whether this is because a minor does
not himself have the right to vote or because he cannot make a valid
delegation to another to vote for him.156 Other states have said that
where an infant has the right to become a stockholder, he has all the
attendant rights of every other stockholder, and this would seem to indicate that in such. states a minor may execute a proxy.157
elusive upon the question of intent where change of title is involved from the standpoint
of taxation.•••" See hene W. Johnson, 39 B.T.A. 702 at 708 (1939).
148 De

Funiak, "Infants as Members of Corporations," 28 GEORGETOWN L. REv. 320

(1939).
140 I.R.C. §25(b)(l)(D).
150 Supra pp. 540 and 542.
1111 CmuSTY AND McLEAN,

THE TRANSFER oF STOCK, 2d ed., §69, pp. 124, 125
(1940). See 69 A.L.R. 658 (1930) on the question of the liability as a stockholder of one
purchasing stock for or transferring stock to an infant.
152 CmuSTY AND McLEAN, THE TRANSFER oF STocK, 2d ed., §218, p. 367 (1940).
153 Id. at p. 125.
154 5 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP. §2053 (1931). See also De Funiak, "Infants as Members of Corporations," 28 GEORGETOWN L. REv. 320 at 330, 331 (1939).
155 State v. Voight, 2 Ohio App. 145 (1913). See however, 6 Ohio Gen. Code (Page,
(1938) §8623-53. Cf. In re United Towns Bldg. & Loan Assn., 79 N.J.L. 31, 74 A. 310
(1909).
156 The latter ground would appear more reasonable. See De Funiak, ''Infants as
Members of Corporations," 28 GEORGBTOWN L. REv. 320 at 331 (1939); 5 FLETCBER, CYc.
CoRP, §2053 (1931),
157 Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Kowalski, 307 lli. 378, 138 N.E. 634 (1923).
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It is often assumed that a gift of stock certificates to a minor, if complete and irrevocable, will qualify for a gift tax exclusion, but the question is not free from doubt. There are no helpful decisions, largely because the problem does not get before the courts. Transfer agents do
not as a rule inquire the age of a transferee, and if no gift tax return is
made, the transaction is not scrutinized and the issue is not raised. On
principle, it would seem th~t if a minor has no legal guardian and cannot legally transfer title to stock, cannot vote or give proxies, cannot exercise stock rights and participate in corporate actions without a legal
guardian, is too young to have his own bank account or be able to endorse dividend checks, invest or dispose of the proceeds in his own right,
these circumstances may amount to a deprivation of rights and a ''barri~r" to present enjoyment sufficient to deny the exclusion. He is in a
position of having rights which he cannot exercise or enjoy until a
future time. On the other hand, a legal guardianship for the minor,
operative at the time the gift is made of corporate shares, may remove
many of the obstacles stemming from his incompetency and permit such
a gift to qualify for an annual exclusion.158
Various attempts have been made to effectuate gifts to minors
through trust arrangements and third-party devices. For example, in
Prudence Miller Trust1 59 a grandparent made gifts of money and stocks
to a minor grandchild, but had the stock registered in the name of parents. The question was whether a trust was thereby created. The Tax
Court held that for income tax exemption purposes an-outright gift to
the minors had been made, not a trust. On the other hand, in Heller 60
and Herberts1 61 parents placed stock in their name "as trustee" for
minor children, and the gifts came before the Tax Court on questions
· of liability of the parents for income taxes on the property transferred.
In the Heller case the court found that no actual trust was intended, and
the parents remained liable for the tax. In Herberts the evidence was
thought to establish a trust over which the donor retained the equivalent
of economic ownership of the stock and hence remained liable for income taxes on income and capital gains. No case has been found involving such arrangements for gift tax purposes, but the principles and
conclusions applicable to trusteed savings accounts for minors would
appear to be controlling and render highly questionable the qualification of any such arrangement for a present interest for gift tax purposes.
11'18 See Lawrence Miller, 2 T.C. 285 (1943).
1r,o 7 T.C. 1245 (1946).
1ao41 B.T.A. 1020 (1940).
1a110 T.C. 1053 (1948).
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Insurance
Insurance has many attractions for a tax-minded donor desirous of
making lifetime gifts to minors. It lends itself well to gifts within the
annual exclusion. It is a type of property that does not require investment attention or involve the income tax consequences which gifts
of dividend-paying stocks or other forms of income-producing property
entail. Also, as the sales argument runs, it "affords a vehicle for
making gifts inconspicuous and in a manner not likely to affect the
child's thinking or ambitions or be a temptation to spend when he
attains majority."162
On the legal side, it is clear that an insurance policy may be the subject of a valid gift.163 Theoretically, the insurance to be given to a
minor might be issued on the life of the donor of the policy or on the
life of the minor or on the life of some third person within the family
group.
The use of a policy on the donor's life as the subject of the gift is
ordinarily frowned upon for the reason that even though the donor
transfers all incidents of ownership, yet if he continues to pay the premiums from year to year as the gift would require, the proceeds would
be taxable in his estate notwithstanding the gift.164
This leaves for consideration insurance on the child's life and insurance on the life of some third person within the family group. It
may be assumed that an insurable interest exists in each case.165
As for insurance on the child's life, most companies write juvenile
insurance from very early age, some even from birth. If the minor is
age fifteen or over, he himself may commonly apply for and acquire a
policy on his own life and pay the premium thereon. 166 If the minor
is under age fifteen, the donor would have to make application and have
the policy issued and made payable to the minor. Also as to insurance
on the life of a third person within the family group, the donor would
make application and have the policy issued and made payable to the
child.
162 See THB fu:u.1. GIFT FOR MINOR Clm.DREN, THB VAJ.L TAX LEnim, No. 131
(December 1947).
163 In re Thompson's Estate, 328 Ill. App. 103, 65 N.E. (2d) 131 (1946); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Woolf, 138 N.J. Eq. 450, 47 A. (2d) 340 (1946); Annotation,
47 A.L.R. 738 (1927).
164!.R.C. §8ll(g)(2)(A); PAUL, Fm>BRAL EsrATE AND GIFT TAXATION §10.35
(1946 Supp.).
165 Drane v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 139 Tex. IOI, 161 S.W. (2d) 1057
(1942); 44 C.J.S., Insurance, §204, p. 907; I Coucn, INsURANCB §294, p. 763 (1929).
166 See note 76 supra.
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On the question of completeness of a gift of an insurance policy,
the matter turns largely on where the incidents of ownership and the
benefits reside and what the donor has done to divest himself of dominion over the policy.167 A parol assignment alone would not be sufficient delivery, nor perhaps even a written assignment, unless accompanied by delivery of the policy itself.168 Delivery of a written assignment to the insurer with the policy and having the necessary indorsements entered thereon to show transfer of title would undoubtedly be
persuasive evidence of completeness,169 as in the case of corporate stock.
Custody of the policy has been said to be of little consequence on the
rights of the donee,170 but as with corporate stock, failure to deliver the
assigned policy would have important bearing in tax connections on the
issue of completeness of surrender of dominion and control. If all incidents of ownership and benefits under the policy are vested in the minor
absolutely and the policy is turned over to him or to someone on his behalf, the gift should be regarded as complete.
More difficult is the question of whether a gift of an insurance policy to a minor, either on his own life or on the life of a parent or other
relative, and the subsequent payment of premiums thereon by the
donor, qualifies for a gift tax exclusion. It is clear that a gift of an
insurance policy by assignment or otherwise constitutes a taxable transfer for gift tax purposes and that payment of annual premiums on the
policy to keep it in force creates a gift tax liability,1 71 but does the donee
receive any interest which can qualify as a present interest? It might be
supposed that the courts would have answered the question many times,
but there is a dearth of decisions, especially among the appellate courts.
Most donors assume such gifts to be present interests, £.le no informational or other returns, and the question is rarely raised.
Presumably the outright gift of a policy is not that of a "future interest" merely because under the terms of the policy itself, its full value
will not mature until some future date.172 Rather the question turns on
the present rights of ownership and control which the donee does or
167 24 AM. }UR., Gifts, §70, p. 766; Annotation, 47 A.L.R. 738 (1927).
168 Annotation, 47 A.L.R. 738 (1927).
·
169 MoNTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAXEs, ESTATES, TRusTs AND GxFTS 1010 (1948-49).
110 Grosz v. Grosz, 151 Ore. 438, 50 P. (2d) 119 (1935); Wood v. Phoenix Mutual

Life Ins. Co., 22 La. Ann. 617 (1870).
111 Treas. Reg. 108, §86.2(a)8.
172 Treas. Reg. 108, §86.11; RABKIN AND JOHNSON, FEDERAL lNcoME, GIFT AND
ESTATE TAXATION, I-1, §2, p. 3612 (1942); 2 POLISHER, ESTATE PLANNING AND ESTATE
TAX SAVING 450 (1948); Hilgedag, "Life Insurance Planning for Estate and Gift Taxes,"
5th ANNuAL NEw YoRK Umv. lNsnTUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION 25 at 51 (1947).
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does not acquire in the policy at the time of the gift.173 If the donee
has the right to obtain the cash surrender value of the policy and freely
to exercise other rights of ownership, the tax court has held that a gift
of an insurance policy will constitute a gift of a present interest.174 Also,
it has been held that where the gift of a policy is one of a future interest, subsequent premiums (at least to the extent attributable to an increase in cash value) to keep the policy alive and in force are also of a
future interest.m; Conversely, if the gift is one of a present interest,
subsequent premium payments (at least to the same extent) paid on
the policy will also be deemed to be gifts of a present interest.176
If any of the usual incidents of ownership are withheld or have
conditions attached, clearly the gift will not qualify for the exclusion.
Thus, if the ownership does not shift to the donee until he attains the
stated age, or if the donee has no right to take down the cash value at
all or only after attaining majority or some other age, or if no right is
given him to change the beneficiary, or if consent of other persons is
required to such change of beneficiary,1 77 borrow on the policy, or
exercise other incidents of ownership, the gift undoubtedly would be
held to be a gift of a future interest.178
One perplexing problem is whether the policy must have a cash
value at the time of the gift. In a 1943 Tax Court case,1 79 a policy
given to minor children provided for no cash value until three premiums had been paid. At issue, among other things, was the status of
173 PAm., Fm>ImAL EsTATE AND GIFr TAXATION §15.11, p. 977: " ••• the courts
would probably hold that a direct beneficiary or assignee of a life insurance policy who may
obtain its cash surrender value and exercise the other incidents of ownership has received
a present interest." See also 1946 Supp. §15.11, p. 632. Hilgedag, "Life lnSUiance Planning for Estate and Gift Tax~," 5th AmmAL NEw YoRK Umv. ms'I'lTUTE ON FEDERAL
TAXATION 25 at 51 (1947).
114 Arthur A. Frank, 3 T.C.M. 1180, CCH Dec. No. 14,227(M) (1944); 2 Pousmm,
EsTATE PLANNING AND ESTATE TAX SAVING 450 (1948): "It may be stated as a gniding
principle that the same tests are applied to gifts of inSUiance policies as to other interests
to determine whether or not the donor is entitled to the statutory annual exclusion. The
rights retained by the donor and the meaSUie of dominion or control vested in the donee."
175 Frances P. Bolton, 1 T.C. 717 at 724 (1943); Commissioner v. Boeing, (9th Cir.
1941) 123 F. (2d) 86; Dora Roberts, 2 T.C. 679 at 687 (1943), alfd. (5th Cir. 1944)
143 F. (2d) 657; PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION §15.11, p. 641 (1946
Supp.).
176 Sidney R. Baer, 2 T.C.M. 285 (1943). See concurring opinion in Commissioner
v. Boeing, (9th Cir. 1941) 123 F. (2d) 86; Chittenden v. Hassett, 32 A.F.T.R. 1635
(1943).
111 Spyros P. Skouras, 14 T.C. 523 (1950), CCH Dec. No. 17568.
11s Joe J. Perkins, 1 T.C. 982 (1943); Dora Roberts, 2 T.C. 679 (1943); Frances P.
Bolton, 1 T.C. 717 (1943); Clara Ream, 2 T.C.M. 1067, CCH Dec. No. 13,62l(M)
(1943).
11s Nashville Trust Co. Oohn H. Clark Estate), 2 T.C.M. 992, CCH Dec. No.
13,588(M) (1943).
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the first two premiums. The court held that it was not enough that
there were no restrictions in the donee's right to receive the cash value of
the policy; the policy had to have a realizable cash value at the time of
the gift. Since the policy had no cash value when assigned, the interest
given was held to be a future interest. A year later however in a somewhat parallel case, the Tax Court1 80 held the opposite way and planted
its decision solely on the fact that the beneficiaries at all times had full
rights of ownership. On the point of cash surrender value, the court
merely said that the commissioner had failed to prove that the policy had
no cash surrender value in the taxable year, and in any event that cash
surrender value is only one of the factors entering into the value of the
policy. This holding seems sounder and being later might be expected
to prevail, but the failure of the court to overrule or distinguish the ear. lier case leaves the question unsettled. The policies of many companies
carry a first-year cash value even though small, and in those cases the
point may be academic; in other situations, it is a matter to be considered
by the donor at the time of assigning the policy.
Will the designation of contingent or successive beneficiaries and
owners preclude the allowance of a gift tax exclusion? Assume in the
policy on the minor's life that his sister is named to receive the proceeds
upon his death rather than the minor's estate, or in a policy on the life
of the minor's parent that his sister is designated as successive owner
and payee in case the minor dies during the insured's lifetime. No case
in point has been found, but it would seem that such a provision might
make the gift a "future interest" on the analogy of the trust cases, since
it cannot be determined when the gift is made who the ultimate beneficiaries of the gift will be.181
Some insurance companies seek to avoid any possible future interest
effect of designating successive or contingent beneficiaries by giving the
minor the unrestricted right to revoke such designation, the argument being that such right to revoke is the legal equivalent of a right
to an immediate enjoyment.182
Such a contention points up the question inherent in all gifts of
insurance policies to minors of whether the investiture of rights and
powers of ownership and control of the policy in a minor child, without
more, is enough to satisfy the present interest test, or whether it must
further appear that these rights are capable of being ~ffectively exercised
1so Arthur A. Frank, 3 T.C.M. 1180, CCH Dec. No. 14,227(M) (1944); See PAUL,
FEDERAL ESTATB AND GIFT TAXATION §15.11, p. 632, note 32A (1946 Supp.).
1s1 John M. Smyth, 2 T.C.M. 4, CCH Dec. No. 13,173(M) (1943); Ryerson

United States, 312 U.S. 405, 61 S.Ct. 656 (1941).
182 See note 59 supra.
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by the minor or someone on his behalf. The child's legal incompetency
makes him incapable of exercising such rights, and any attempt to do so
would be subject to disaffi.rmance on majority. A parent as such has no
right to deal with the child's property or rights. A legal guardian alone,
duly appointed and authorized by a competent court, would have the
authority to exercise any incidents of ownership under the policy.182•
If a child has no legal guardian when the policy is assigned to him,
he may then be in a position of having legal rights which cannot be
exercised until he becomes of age, and hence there is a deferment of
rights as substantial as if acquired only at a future date. If the answer
be made that a guardian could be appointed at any time when need
arises for an exercise of any of the incidents of ownership, the reply of
the tax collector would seem to be that the deferment is not any the less
real or actual until such appointment takes place.
Nor will the trusteeing of insurance for the benefit of a minor assure
attainment of the objectives of an effective gift. An irrevocable transfer of policies to a trustee for a child may amount to a completed gift so
as to remove the insurance from the donor's estate, but it has been held
on frequent occasions that a gift of a policy in trust is by reason of that
very circumstance a gift of a future interest.183
Thus far the discussion has centered on gifts of life insurance to
minors, but the same considerations would apply to annuity contracts.184
The fact that annuities are essentially contracts for the future payment
of funds does not appear to preclude their qualifying as a gift of a
present interest if the donee is given the present right to obtain their
cash value and exercise other rights of ownership. Some annuities are
written without cash value, deferred or immediate, and in such cases
the gift would clearly be a gift of a future interest. Most annuity contracts now written for minors not only provide for a cash value, but extend settlement option rights, borrowing privileges, and other immediately exercisable benefits to the annuitant. Obviously, any restrictions
on the right to exercise such benefits, privileges, or rights would create
a future interest.185
1s2a See Spyros P. Skouras, 14 T.C. 523 (1950), CCH Dec. No. 17568, where guardianship proceedings were instituted for minors in connection with gifts of insurance policies
in order that there might be someone "legally empowered to act for the minors" in the
exercise of policy rights.
1ss Jesse S. Phillips, 12 T.C. 216 (1949); George B. Caudle, 4 T.C.M. 324 (1945);
Commissioner v. Boeing, (9th Cir. 1941) 123 F. (2d) 86 at 87; PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAXATION §15.11, p. 640 (1946 Supp.).
_184 Dora Roberts, 2 T.C. 679 (1943); RABKIN AND JoHNsoN, FEDERAL INcoME, GIFT
AND ESTATE TAXATION I-3, §1, p. 3807 (1942).
1s5 Dora Roberts, 2 T.C. 679 (1943).
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Looking at insurance gifts to minors as a whole, it would appear that

if any insurance gift qualifies for a tax exclusion, it is one whereunder
the policy is owned py and payable to the minor or his estate with no
reservations, conditions, or deferments annexed as to the right to cash
value or proceeds, or as to the exercise of change of beneficiary or other
privileges and has some initial demonstrable value by way of cash value
or otherwise, and there is a legal guardianship in operation for the minor
at the time of the gift.
If a child is over the age of fifteen years and is permitted to apply
for and acquire insurance on his own life, it may be preferable to make
gifts of cash to the child and allow him to purchase the policy and pay
the premiums thereon. 186 If he is under such age and local statutes au- thorize guardians of minors to invest in insurance, it may be possible to
have a legal guardian appointed for the child and with court approval
invest gifts of cash in insurance contracts on the life of the child.187
To overcome a troublesome situation that arises when a donor dies
before paying all premiums due under an insurance contract while the
donee is still a minor, many insurance companies issue a supplementary
contract on the life of the donor in an amount sufficient to guarantee
payment of future premiums. Such supplementary insurance may entail undesirable death tax consequences to the donor, and the contingency would best seem to be met through appropriate provisions in the
donor's will or by resort to options which operate automatically where
the death of the donor occurs before the minor attains majority.

Real Estate
As to real estate, it is settled that a minor may be a grantee of a deed
and acquire rights in land. 188 But as with other forms of property, the
legal elements of a gift must be unequivocally satisfied.189
Where at the time of the execution and acknowledgment of a deed
to a four-month-old child, the grantee pointed to the child and remarked
to the mother, "She is early in acquiring property" and handed the deed
186 Roberts v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1944) 143 F. (2d) 657 at 658.
187 Lawrence Miller, 2 T.C. 285 at 288 (1943).
188 6 THOMPSON, REAL PnoPl!RTY §§3123, 3124, p. 262 et seq. (1940),

and cases
cited; Masterton v. Cheek, 23 Ill. 72 (1859); Davis' Committee v. Loney, 290 Ky. 644,
162 S.W. (2d) 196 (1942). However, a conveyance to an infant like a conveyance by
him is voidable and may be repudiated on arrival at full age. 5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPl!RTY,
3d ed., §1369, p. 205 (1939).
_
189 Masterton v. Cheek, 23 Ill. 72 at 76 (1859); Ireland v. Geraghty, (D.C. Ill.
1883) 15 F. 35 at 39: " ••• there is no doubt that the granter in such a deed should do
some act manifesting an intention to deliver the deed and make it effective." 4 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPl!RTY, 3d ed., §§1033-1063 (1939).

1951]

GIFTS FOR THE BENEFIT OF MINORS

561

towards the child but did not give it into her hands but kept it himself,
and the deed was never recorded and was found among his papers after
his death three years later, it has been held that no delivery had been
made.190
On the other hand, the recording of a deed to a minor has generally been held sufficient evidence of delivery, even though the grantor has
thereafter retained the deed in his possession.191 No case has been found
involving the question of whether a direct gift of a fee interest in real
estate to a minor constitutes a present interest where the donor has retained possession of the deed. The same considerations applicable to corporate stocks would appear to govern, and for tax purposes, any such
retention might well prevent the gift from being considered complete.
Of all possible forms of property, real estate is the least appropriate
for gifts to minors, with or without legal guardians. Land does not lend
itself readily to transfers small enough to come within the gift tax exclusion, and problems of leasing, mortgaging, selling, condemning, and
adjusting £re losses become infinitely more complicated when minors
are involved. Legal guardianships are not only inevitable, but statutory
proceedings governing infants' interests in land are complex and burdensome. A land trust may solve some of the problems, but not all. 192

Trusts
The chief reluctance which donors have to making outright gifts
is that by their very nature they permit no reservation of control or supervision of the minor's interests. When the child attains majoritywhich may be as early as age eighteen-the property is his to consume
or conserve. Many donors prefer some supervision of the property given to their children not only during minority, but even continuing for
some period beyond. Such desires suggest the trust device and undoubtedly the function of a trust is to supply these features. Also, if irrevocable and absolute and not subject to any retained controls, a gift in trust
will remove the property from the donor's estate.193
As for the gift tax exclusion, a transfer in trust runs into as many,
if not more, difficulties as any of the mediums of gift already discussed.
v. Geraghty, (D.C. ill. 1883) 15 F. 35.
v. Stansberry, 249 ill. 487, 94 N.E. 940 (1911); Colee v. Colee, 122 Ind.
109, 23 N.E. 687 (1890); Gulf Red Cedar Co. v. Crenshaw, 169 Ala. 606, 53 S. 812
(1910); Annotation, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 230; 26 C.J.S., Deeds, §44, p. 246.
102 See B. H. Klein, 14 T.C. 687 (1950) (income tax). The trusteeing of the minor's
interest under a conventional land trust would create a future interest for gift tax purposes
in corpus and perhaps also as to income.
193 2 Pousmm, EsTATB PLANNING AND ESTATE TAX SAVING, c. XXI, p. 486 et. seq.
(1948).
190 Ireland
191 Decker
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In the case of an irrevocable trust, there are ordinarily two estates
involved for gift tax purposes, one being the present estate or right to
income, the other being the remainder interest after the income right.194
Where there is a present right to income, a gift tax exclusion is allowed
to the extent of the actuarial value of that right. 195 If there is no present
right to income, no exclusion is available and the entire gift in excess of
the lifetime exemption is taxable.196
It is settled that for the right to income to qualify for an exclusion,
the trust instrument must ·direct current distributions of the trust income to be made to the beneficiary or for his benefit.197 Any discretion
to accumulate or withhold income will lose the exclusion not only as to
the value of the income right, but as to corpus as well.1 98 This means
a donor cannot have both the protective features of a discretionary trust
for a minor and a gift tax exclusion at the same time.
If he chooses the exclusion and directs the income to be distributed
currently to the minor, and if the donor is also the child's parent, he may
find himself being taxed for income taxes on the trust income and for
estate taxes if he dies in the interim, on the ground that the trust operates to discharge his legal obligations or is otherwise for his pecuniary
benefit.199 This course may also necessitate a legal guardianship, particularly if the income is in excess of the minor's needs and has to be
invested or otherwise protected.
For all practical purposes, the current decisions appear to deny
availability of an annual exclusion for gifts in trust for the benefit of
194 Fisher v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1942) 132 F. (2d) 383; Charles v. Hassett,
(D.C. Mass. 1942) 43 F. Supp. 432; Commissioner v. Wisotzkey, (1st Cir. 1941) 144 F.
(2d) 63:Z.
195 RABKIN AND JoHNsON, FEDERAL lNcoME, Gn:T AND ESTATE TAXATION, G-1, §10,
p. 2923 (1942): " ••• the value of a ••. life estate is determined by allocating the value
of the property between the income right and the remainder in accordance with the Treas·
uxy's annuity tables."
196 United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399, 61 S.Ct. 659 (1941); Commissioner v.
Brandegee, (1st Cir. 1941) 123 F. (2d) 58. See Hessenbruch v. Commissioner,.(3d Cir.
1950) 178 F. (2d) 785, where there was only a three month period of minority during
which accumulation might occur.
197Fondren v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 18, 65 S.Ct. 499 (1945); Commissioner v.
Disston, 325 U.S. 442, 65 S.Ct. 1328 (1945); Welch v. Paine, (1st Cir. 1941) 120 F.
(2d) 141; Commissioner v. Taylor, (3d Cir. 1941) 122 F. (2d) 714, cert. den. 314 U.S.
699, 62 S.Ct. 479 (1942); United States v. Knell, (7th Cir. 1945) 149 F. (2d) 331;
Childers, 10 T.C. 566 (1948); Scarborough, 8 T.C.M. 480, CCH Dec. No. 16,98l(M)
(1949).
198 See cases note 197.
100 Wallace Townsend, Tuer. v. Thompson, (D.C. Ark. 1950) CCH Federal Estate
and Gift Tax Reports, Dec. No. 10,780; Schneider, "The Inter Vivos Trust for a Minor:
Its Estate Tax Aspect," 28 TAXEs 825 at 827 (1950).
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minors. 200 Where a grandparent or other person without a legal obligation of support to the minor is the donor of the trust and the minor is
of sufficient maturity and so situated economically that some foreseeable
amount of income will be required for his needs and the trustee is directed to pay the income to him or use the income for his benefit during
minority or is authorized to do so according to some fixed external standard, a case for the recognition of a present interest in the income may be
made out. On the other hand, when the donor is the parent with a legal
obligation of support of the minor, any framing of a trust to create a
present interest in income in the child is by that circumstance almost
certain to subject the donor to income and estate taxes, as a transfer in
discharge of a legal obligation and for his pecuniary benefit.201
The suggestion appears in certain cases that if the income from a
trust for a minor's benefit is payable in all events, the income right
will qualify for a present interest, even though the income is paid to a
guardian or parent or held by the trustee and paid to the minor when he
comes of age. Most of these cases have been decided before Fondren
and Disston.202 The others203 fail to take account of the view of the
Supreme Court that a duty to pay over income is not enough to estab-lish a present interest and that there must be a correlative showing of
the amount which can reasonably be expected to be applied for the
minor's benefit. Income mandatorily payable to a parent or a guardian
or held by a trustee until a minor comes of age, without a showing of
reasonable expectation of immediate application to the minor's benefit,
hardly seems to satisfy the required test, and for that reason, the cases
so holding may be questioned.
Most irrevocable trusts now established by parents for minor beneficiaries direct a mandatory accumulation of income until the minor
reaches majority. A future interest in income and corpus is thereby
clearly created and admittedly the gift is ineligible for an annual exclusion.204 However, such a transfer enables the donor to utilize his lifetime exemption (in effect doubled when the gift is consented to by the
200 2 Pousmm, EsTATB PLANNING AND ESTATE TAX SAVING
201 Schneider, "The Inter Vivos Trust for a Minor: Its Estate

445 at 446 (1948).
Tax Aspect," 28 TAXBS

825 at 827 (1950).
202 Arthur C. Stifel, 46 B.T.A. 568 (1942); Charles Roeser, 2 T.C. 298 (1943);
Kinney v. Anglim, (D.C. Cal. 1941) 43 F. Supp. 431; Commissioner v. Fisher, (9th Cir.
1942) 132 F. (2d) 383.
20s Commissioner v. Sharp, (9th Cir. 1946) 153 F. (2d) 163; Strekalovsky v. Delaney,
(D.C. Mass. 1948) 78 F. Supp. 556; Louise McCoy, 6 T.C.M. 1097, CCH Dec. No.
16,078(M) (1947).
204 Supra note 196.
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spouse) and to reduce income and death tax liabilities.205 This achievement is of considerable advantage and of itself often makes the establishment of irrevocable trusts for minors desirable.
Conclusion

The present state of the tax law applicable to gifts to or for the benefit of minors leads to the conclusion that such gifts when made from
tax motives are frequently doomed to failure and disappointment; that
donors generally do not realize that more is required to establish such
gifts for fixing tax liability than is required to transfer ownership, and
that the burden of proof is on them to establish a present gift; that the
allowance of a gift tax exclusion for gifts to or for the benefit of minors
is the exception rather than the general rule; and that many gifts which
are made to minors within the annual exclusion limit are in fact future
gifts calling for the payment of gift tax on each dollar of gift and laying
the donors open to penalities for failure to file returns, against which
good faith and reasonable belief are no excuse.
It is said with much merit that such a conclusion makes the question of present versus future interest tum upon the accidental circums~nce of a minor's disability and thus penalizes gifts to rninors.200
Nevertheless the tendency of the taxing authorities to consider such
gifts as generally taxable cannot be ignored.
205 Supra note 6.
200 Note, 37 A.B.A.J.

78 at 79 (1951): "It will be some time before the final word is
spoken on this subject, but the trend of court decisions is not encouraging. Perhaps the
Seventh Circuit will provide a satisfactory answer, but it will not be surprising if legislation
becomes necessary to achieve fair treatment for gifts to minors,"

